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PROFESSOR JAMES MAY: Welcome, one and all, to our weeklong Centennial Celebration and to this morning's session on Legal
Education Then and Now: Changing Patterns in Legal Training and
in the Relationship of Law Schools to the World Around Them.
We're really honored this morning to have a truly terrific panel to
speak to us on some of the most fundamentally contested issues in
legal education, both past and present. Joining us this morning are
Professor Jack Schlegel from the State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law; Professor Bob Gordon from Yale Law School; and
ProfessorJoan Williams of the Washington College of Law ("WCL").
I'm Jim May, and I'll be moderating the session this morning. Before introducing the speakers, I would like to say a few brief words
about the path that WCL has traveled these past 100 years to arrive
here at our new home.
We have now moved into what is our lucky eleventh and best home
for WCL since its beginning with the Woman's Law Class of 1896, but
let me first back up and set the context for the founding of WCL. In
1873, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Bradley famously declared that
women had no right to become lawyers because, he said, "The para. This Colloquium, held on April 8, 1996, was part of a week-long series of events celebrating the Washington College of Law's Centennial Anniversary.
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mount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And
the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general constitution
of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases."'
Twenty-three years later, two exceptional attorneys and feminists in
the nation's capitol, Ellen Spencer Mussey and Emma Gillett, established the Woman's Law Class to provide women with a greater opportunity for legal training.2 The Woman's Law Class soon evolved
into the Washington College of Law, which was designed primarily
for women. In fact, at the time of WCL's 1964 groundbreaking for
the Myers Building, a woman was the oldest living law graduate. Although the Law School was primarily for women, it was, from the
start, open to men as well.4 Sadly, the School's inclusiveness in those
early years was not universal. The new School, like all of the law
schools in the nation's capital at that time except for Howard University Law School, was open only to whites.
The early teachers and students at WCL did not strive merely to
communicate and absorb what they believed to be the relevant fundamentals of legal training within society as it then existed. Many of
the early professors and students at WCL sought to change the legal
rules of that society and society itself by joining prominently in the
early twentieth century struggle for a women's suffrage amendment
to the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, the first dean of the Law School,
Ellen Spencer Mussey, suffered severely as a result of the attacks on
the suffrage demonstrators who marched here in Washington, D.C.
on the day before President Wilson's inauguration, and Mussey was

1. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1872).
2. Ellen Spencer Mussey and Emma Gillett began the Woman's Law Class in 1896 with
three women as students. See Ronald Chester, A Survey of WCL Women Graduates: The 1920s
Through the 1940s, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 627, 627 (1983) (discussing birth of WCL as response to
difficulties women faced in late nineteenth century in pursuing careers in law); Mary L. Clark,
The Foundingof the Washington College ofLaw: The FirstLaw School Establishedby Women for Women,
47 AM. U. L. REV. 613, 633 (1998); Audrey Pia, Foundingof the Washington College of Law, 32AM.
U. L. REV 617, 617 (1983) (stating that WCL was established because no other law school in the
District of Columbia except for Howard University admitted women into its program).
"[C]lasses were held in Mussey's law offices, where she taught Constitutional Law, Contracts,
and Personal Property, while Gillett taught Blackstone, Bills and Notes, and Domestic Relations." WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW, WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW: CELEBRATING A
CENTURY OF EXCELLENCE 1896-1996, at 6 (1996) [hereinafter CELEBRATING A CENTURY]. Two
years later, the school was incorporated as the Washington College of Law. See id. at 7.
3. The John Sherman Myers Law School Building was dedicated in 1964 on American
University's main campus. Myers Hall remained home to WCL until January 1996. See
WASHINGTON COLLEGE OFLAw, CELEBRATING A CENTURY-FACTS AND EVENTS 1896-1996 (1996)
[hereinafter TIMELINE] (showing timeline of WCL's location, number of students, faculty and

staff, admission requirements, number of degrees granted, curriculum, and tuition).
4. See CELEBRATING A CENTURY, supranote 2, at 7.
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forced to step down as a result, to be replaced by Emma Gillett.5
The ultimately successful struggle for the Woman's Suffrage
Amendment, of course, was waged by two major organizations, the
National American Woman's Suffrage Association, headed by Carrie
Chapman Catt,6 and the National Women's Party, the more militant
of the two organizations, which Alice Paul headed.7 Alice Paul herself, of course, would come to WCL to add a law degree to the Ph.D.
she already had from the University of Pennsylvania, and would
graduate from the Law School in 1923, the same year that she would
draft the initial version of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment. 8
In 1920, the year that the Suffrage Amendment was added to the
Constitution, 9 WCL moved to 1315 K Street, N.W. Six years later, in
1926, we moved to a new building located at 2000 G Street, N.W.
There, the law school would stay for almost the next forty years. 10 As
you can see from an early ad recruiting students, the tuition of fifty
dollars a semester didn't quite stay unchanged, but the building did
for many, many decades. And it was in that building that students
gained a legal education during a time of tremendous change in the
country.
In those four decades, law and legal education in the nation's capital and throughout the country would be substantially affected by the
experience of the stock market Crash, the Depression, and the New
Deal; then later by the concerns and perspectives resulting from the
Cold War; and then in the 1960s by such changing concerns and developments as those associated with the Civil Rights Movement. Still
later, by the early-to-mid 1960s, before WCL left its old building on G
Street and moved to the Myers Building on the main campus, law
and legal education were affected by the revival of the modern
women's rights movement, which would build upon, and, in many
respects, revisit the work of early twentieth century feminists such as
Ellen Spencer Mussey, Emma Gillett, and Alice Paul.
5. See GRACE HATHAWAY, FATE RIDES A TORTOISE: A BIOGRAPHY OF ELLEN SPENCER
MussEY 167 (1937).
6. Carrie Chapman Catt became President of the National American Women's Suffrage
Association ("NAWSA") in 1916. SeeJoEllen Lind, Dominance and Democracy: The Legacy of
Woman Suffragefor the Voting Right, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 188 (1994) (exploring Supreme
Court's role in reinforcing dominance patterns by its support of laws preventing women from
voting).
7. See SuSAN D. BECKER, THE ORIGINS OF THE ERA: AMERICAN FEMINISM BETWEEN THE
WARS 4 (1981) (providing overview of suffrage movement and its players).
8. The Equal Rights Amendment was first introduced in Congress later that same year.
Its straightforward text read: "Men and Women shall have equal rights throughout the United
States and every place subject to its jurisdiction." Id. at 19.
9. See U.S. CONSr. amend. XIX.
10. SeeTMELINE, supra note 3.
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As we begin our experience with our wonderful new building, it's
instructive to see how far we have come from WCL's earlier home at
2000 G Street, now two chapters behind in our institutional life. As
you can see from the slide, the new building here isn't the first one to
have a Classroom 101, seating about 100 people. The G Street building also boasted a spacious, air conditioned library with a front and
back reading room, with table seating for more than sixty students.
But by 1964 the Law School had outgrown its G Street facilities and
moved to the main campus.
The building on the main campus that we've just left, with the
separate library building that complemented it, like the building in
which we're now sitting, heavily reflects the many contributions and
bears the names of Dean John Sherman Myers and his wife, Alvina
Reckman Myers. That on-campus site was the place where almost all
of the current faculty and students of the Washington College of Law
got their first sense of what it is, respectively, to be either a law professor or a law student.
After more than thirty years on that campus, however, we obviously
began to bulge at the seams and searched throughout the surrounding area for a suitable, hospitable setting. Who can forget being
lured by the Tenleytown neighborhood to the Immaculata campus
and the good times and hijinks we (almost) had there? Or the brief
time we (conceptually) spent at the Cassell Building before finally
moving into our present new facility, after being wooed here by the
neighbors of Spring Valley."
(Laughter.)
PROFESSOR MAY: Now, these very few and really highly selective
aspects of the last 100 years suggest only a very small part of a much
more involved history of experience lived by many generations of
students, staff, and faculty at WCL.
The history of legal education at this law school or at any law
school during the past 100 years is a complex reflection of both very
localized, particular elements and developments, and much more
widespread patterns and forces in the legal profession and in legal
education in general, as well as in the society at large. The history of
any law school powerfully reflects both change and continuity in
thinking and practice over such a long span of time.
11. See, e.g., Duke v. American Univ., 675 A.2d 26 (D.C. 1996) (involving attempt by
neighborhood residents to enjoin American University from moving law school to Spring Valley location); Spring Valley-Wesley Heights Citizen Ass'n v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning
Adjustment, 644 A.2d 434 (D.C. 1994) (affirming Board of Zoning Adjustment's decision that it
lacked authority to prohibit American University from occupying commercially-zoned building
in Spring Valley).
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Indeed, the 100-year history of WCL is inseparably connected to
the larger, complex story of legal education in America that spans
still a longer period of time. Lawyers were trained in America long
before the 1784 appearance of the rather modest, one-room facility
of the first American law school, which was located in Judge Tapping
Reeve's yard in Litchfield, Connecticut. 2 And law school training, of
course, has had a long history in the country. Having said that, it
nevertheless is the case that it is heavily from the late nineteenth century that we have to trace so many of the fundamental, recurring patterns and controversies in modern legal education at WCL and
throughout the country. More particularly, we have to trace many of
the issues that we still grapple with to nationally prominent figures
such as Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell, who has haunted
much of legal education since the 1870s.'3
(Laughter.)
PROFESSOR MAY: It's not just Langdell that gave us a legacy from
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, but also prominent
critics of tendencies associated with Langdell, such as Oliver Wendell
Holmes 4 and Louis Brandeis. s Having said all of that, this larger
story of change and continuity, of substantial consensus and recurring controversy in legal education, is the subject of the remarks of
our speakers this morning. So, without further ado, let me turn the
discussion over to the speakers.
PROFESSOR JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL: Thank you for having
us. I've come to believe, over time, that law school is best described
as a disaster mitigated by students.
(Laughter.)
PROFESSOR SCHLEGEL: If we did not have such good students,
law school would be even worse. I speak from this vantage point: I
12. Judge Tapping Reeve began teaching students the law through apprenticeship. In
1782, Reeve set out to develop a fifteen-month course of lectures, and two years later, he
opened a small classroom next to his home. See Donald F. Melhorn, A Moot Court Exercise: Debating Judicial Review Prior to Marbury v. Madison, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 327, 328 (1995)
(reviewing history of legal education with an eye to understanding origins of early debates on
judicial review prior to Marbury v. Madison); see also Amy M. Colton, Note, Eyes to the Future, Yet
Remembering the Past: Reconciling Traditionwith the Future of LegalEducation,27 U. MICH.J.L. REF.
963, 964-75 (1994) (examining history of American law schools).
13. See, e.g., ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE
1850s TO THE 1980s, at 35-42 (1983); John Henry Schlegel, Langdell's Legacy or, the Case of the
Empty Envelope, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1517, 1517-32 (1984) (book review); Russell L. Weaver, Langdell's Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 VILL. L. REv. 517, 520-41 (1991) (discussing Langdell's contribution to study of law).
14. For recent accounts of Holmes' thinking, see NEIL DUXBURY, PATrERNS OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 32-48 (1995); MORTONJ. HORwrfZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1870-1960, at 109-43 (1992).
15. See HORWITZ, supranote 14, at 182, 204-05.
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went to the University of Chicago Law School in the mid-Sixties. It
was probably the best legal education available at the time, but I
surely didn't experience it as such. No, this is not another story
about why I hated my legal education, a story which each of you
could contribute to. To be quite honest, I didn't hate law school.
Most of the time, I was just totally bewildered by the experience. Law
school wasn't about anything. Oh, we spent a great deal of time talking and thinking about the rules of law, understanding their purposes, and trying to find out whether they were the right rules, rules
supported by sound policy. But I am the grandson of a Chicago alderman and I knew from experience that law wasn't about rules, but
about power, about who you know, and about how you do things.
Law school was very bewildering to me. I remember, in particular,
a vivid discussion of an old habeas corpus case that may still be
taught, Henry v. Mississippi.'r Aaron Henry was then president of the
NAACP's Mississippi Branch. The question we debated in class was
whether it was proper for the federal courts to interfere in the prosecution of Henry for something or other having to do with the
NAACP at the time. I was totally flabbergasted at the discussion, and
finally I just could not take it any more. I sat in the back of the
class-I almost never spoke-but I screamed out loud, "The Supreme
Court is not going to let Aaron Henry risk his life in a Mississippi
jail!" Instead of the Shavian "universal applause" I craved, I was told
that my comment was irrelevant to the question at issue: the proper
scope of the habeas corpus clause.
I amjust as bewildered by legal education today as I was then. I've
spent much of my twenty-five years of law teaching trying to figure
out how it came to be that what I knew to be law was not the center
of what was discussed in law school. Much of this time has been devoted to a related topic: trying to understand how it is that law
school, a piece of the university that developed at the same time as
departments such as economics, political science, sociology, and
from a common root stock, came to be the only one of these disciplines that was not taken over by the notion that it was an empirical
science, the notion that the proper subject for research and study is
the world out there-the law in action and not the law on the
17
books.
My study of this question spent a lot of time looking at empirical
16.
17.

379 U.S. 443 (1965).
See generally WILLIAM C. CHASE, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL AND THE RISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT 3-60 (1982) (exploring development of American law schools and
legal education).
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research done by American legal realists at Yale and Johns Hopkins
during the 1920s and 1930s.' 8 They did a lot of interesting research,
some about courts, some about divorce, some about auto accidents,
some about parking, some about negotiable instruments-all of
these inquiries into the way the world seemed to work at the time.
Yet, I refer to all of the results as the invention of the square wheel.' 9
From time to time, lawyers go out, they look at the world, they say,
"Oh, how interesting," and then it's forgotten. Then they'll think,
"This is exciting, a new idea; we'll go out and look at the world
again." And they get excited, they tell something, and, thunk, another turn of the square wheel.
My conclusion, that law school resisted empiricism because empirical inquiry into law undermined the professional identity of the
law professor, an identity formed around the notion of law as rule,
seems to have brought forth less outrage than I had hoped for when I
began the project. So much for the satisfaction of having one's hypothesis confirmed by behavior in the world.
I get two responses from law professors. The first is that I do not
understand that the "law is a normative enterprise pursued from an
internal point of view, a view point that empirical science cannot accommodate."2 This is, of course, in some sense true. It clearly describes how some participants in law see their enterprise. But in another sense it is astonishing, for it is just this understanding of law
that was disputed by the Realists, and by me I might add. They believed that law could best be understood as a set of practices of human actors seen from an external point of view. One does not dispute their belief about how something is best understood (and
taught?) by asserting that it is wrong.
The second and better response that I get is a somewhat hesitant
suggestion that I should outline precisely just what I think law school
would be like, how it would be better, if empirical study were at the
center of research and teaching in law. Shades of a demand back in
the heyday of Critical Legal Studies that we lay out in detail how we
would reform a given area of law.
18. Legal realists believe that the principles of law must not be studied in a vacuum, but
rather that they should be "located in the total context in which they are being used-in the
community process in which people are using these doctrines to effect, orjustify, some specific
distribution of values." Myres S. McDougal, The Law School of the Future: From Legal Realism to
Policy Science in the World Community, 56 YALE LJ. 1345, 1345 (1947). See generallyJOHN HENRY
SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL RFALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995) (describing rise
and fall of American legal realism).
19. See SCHLEGEL, supra note 18, at 211-57 (discussing square wheel theory and "reasons
for the decline of the Realists' efforts at empirical legal research").
20. James E. Herget, Book Review, 39 AM.J. LEGAL HIST. 396,397 (1995).
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I am not as exasperated by the request as I was then-age and raising teenagers, I guess. So I wish briefly to answer the question, "well,
what would you do with (though the implicit preposition is 'to') law
school?" as if it were well-intentioned, as it is in the case of my
friends, and not off-putting. In so doing, I wish to suggest what I
think that this school should be like long before its next hundred
years are up. To be direct, it would be a school where a Chicago alderman's grandson would not be bewildered by what was going on.
I take my cue from two classic Realist documents. Edward S. Robinson, Thurman Arnold's sidekick, distinguished between law books,
books directed at the explication and justification (including criticism) of doctrine; and books about law, books directed at understanding how the people and ideas wielded by the people involved in
doing law, work out in the world of contingent human actors.2 ' The
distinction, of course, echoes similar ones made by Holmes2 and
Pound earlier and has been picked up by such later scholars as Max
Rheinstein 24 and Richard Abel.2 About the same time, Karl Llewellyn, not yet seeing the necessity of recanting his Bramble Bush assertion that, "what these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the
law itself, 2 6 equally dogmatically posited that "not rules, but doing" is
what law professors train students for.27 I would put these two ideas
together and suggest that law school ought to be training students to
do the great range of things that law-trained individuals (not just
practicing lawyers) do. Further, I would suggest that the focus of
such an education ought to be on learning how those things are
done, both by reading about how those things are done, reading the
results of good, empirical research designed to develop usable theories about the doing; and by trying, in a neophyte's way, to do those
things as well.
Now one can, I think, argue that at least the second one of these
two things was what Christopher Columbus Langdell was attempting
to do from the start and what good law professors have done ever
since. While teaching doctrine, or as he more accurately called it at
the time, "principles," he was trying to teach his students how to use
principles by engaging in argument with them such as might be had
21.

See EDWARD S. ROBINSON, LAW AND THE LAWYERS (1935).
22. Such as the "bad man" analogy in Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457,459 (1897).
23. SeeRoscoe Pound, Law in Books andLaw in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910).
24.

See MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE AND THE LAw 7

(1972).

25. See Richard Abel, Law Books and Books About Law, 26 STAN. L. REV. 175 (1973).
26. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 3 (1930).
27. See Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 651,654 (1935).
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between counsel or with a judge. And one may even suggest that
Langdell was trying to do the first since he was surely using the techniques of argument common at the time as he knew from his own
practice and from the library record of the appellate courts.
There are three problems with such an understanding. First, the
truly relevant question is not what he was trying to do, but what his
students were learning from his class discussion and most significantly, from his newly instituted exams. I think that they were learning to organize the rules in nice, easily-salable packages, as is surely
the case today when a student is facing a so-called issue-spotting
exam, or any other exam that does not require a student to exercise
and explicitly defend a strategic choice as to what to do and say from
among a range of plausible courses of action.
The other two problems are more interrelated. Arguing to a decision-maker or even another lawyer is not nearly all of what a lawtrained individual does today (or even in 1870). It is this range of activities, and the subject matter specialties, that we should be training
our students to undertake and, even to the extent that lawyers do
make doctrinal arguments (or in the currently fashionable literature,
use the rhetorics of law), there is a big difference between what
Langdell and we today do in this direction. We should be making
explicit those techniques, rather than teaching by means of what
Llewellyn called "dog law": watching examples paraded in front of
one's eyes and having one's nose swatted with a rolled-up newspaper
when one does thejob wrongly.
Put bluntly, at best, the contemporary law school looks at a ridiculously narrow range of legal practice, and even within that range presents almost no explicit theory about how those practices are accomplished. It acts as if law were a normative discipline that could be
understood best from an internal perspective. It was precisely this
perspective that was adopted by Paul Carrington when he suggested
that those without such a perspective, namely some critical legal
scholars, leave the law school for another piece of the academy.2 8
Thus, all I advocate is the much-vaunted union of theory and practice, but explicit theory and very broad practice. By which I mean
what?
My proposition is simply this. I believe that law-trained individuals
acting as such when working for a client fuse three kinds of knowledge: knowledge of the rules of law and how they can be and are
used; knowledge about the routine, and not so routine, activities of
28.

See Paul D. Carrington, OfLaw and the River,34J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984).
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lawyers, government functionaries, people, business entities, private
associations, and government bodies; and, third, knowledge about
the rich social, economic, and political world in which both the rules
and the activities take place.
This is my theory-all intellectual historians are philosophers in
disguise. I'm perfectly willing to see it disproved, or what is more
likely, altered in emphasis depending on the specific practices of lawtrained people that are in question, so long as the disproof or altering is based not on an assertion of what has always been the case in
law schools, but, instead, based on careful, systematic-though most
likely not quantitative-empirical research about what it is that these
people do through the writing of books and articles about law.
What I'm not willing to concede is that law schools today do anything like this, even in the areas of doctrinal argument that they focus on. To do it right, to see law as would the Chicago alderman's
grandson, one would, at the minimum, need to explicitly and equally
avert to all three legs of the three-legged stool of rules, activities, and
context. I say "at the minimum" because given the deep cultural understanding of law as rule-neutrally applied, we probably would have
to work overtime on the activities and context legs to get a stool that
would support any weight, but, for the time being, I'm willing to settle for equality.
Thus, I believe that if we want to train students to do law, we must
see to it that we give students explicit theory and engage them in at
least simulated practice throughout their curriculum. That is, unless
schools start teaching their students to do something explicitly beyond "arguing," and unless this teaching is tied explicitly to the real
practices of real law-trained individuals in real contexts-known, not
through law professors who, as we all do, guess on the basis of talking
to one lawyer and reading a few stories in The New York Times, The
Wall Street Journal, or The NationalJourna but through serious, systematic, and sustained research into what those practices and contexts are-we will continue to do little more than add tinsel to a tree
that is best seen as the justification of state and private power to its
acolytes. Yes, justification, for criticism justifies that which is not
criticized.
What ought this research look like? What ought the teaching look
like? If the practice in question is appellate argument, let this first
scholar start by reading 200 briefs in the Tennessee Court of Appeals
and then talk to a bunch of Tennessee lawyers and judges. On the
basis of that information, tell us how lawyers make arguments, what
kinds are effective, and why. Don't look at the fancy leading cases.
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Look at what happens every day. Generate a theory about what's effective and explicitly teach students that theory so that if the students'
experience proves our theory wrong, they can explicitly correct it and
tell us. If the topic is the practice of criminal law, teach students the
vast literature that explains who's prosecuted and how prosecution
and defense attorneys act. Then gather readable data about how the
few trials that take place are done, about the way that constitutional
guarantees work in the process, and about the dozens of other questions that make criminal practice so simple and so complicated, and
teach that explicitly, too. Teach theory based on knowledge about
the world of practice and let students try out that theory through
simulations or, when appropriate, through clinics that are an integral
part of the classroom and not some "thing" that flits over at the side
of the building where we let the poor people in through the back
door.
If the practice is corporate transactions, which is my stuff, then talk
to the players-corporate executives, investment bankers, government officials, mutual and hedge fund operators, bankers, and eventually lawyers-about the game and bring that total understanding
back into the classroom wrapped up in a theory, an explanation of
what is going on. Teach that theory explicitly to our students and
make them play out the lawyer's piece right there in class. My guess
is, exposed to practices like this in criminal law and appellate argument, students might-just might-not be so bored by the time they
have been in the building for three semesters.
I'm always invited to these sorts of occasions and I always feel I'm
about as welcome as a skunk at a garden party.
(Laughter.)
PROFESSOR SCHLEGEL: I have no idea why people keep telling
me to come flagellate them for doing terrible things. It's a truly odd
thing to do at a celebration.
So what I'm trying to say to you all is stop teaching law and start
teaching about law and about doing law. Stop constantly attempting
to justify the unjustifiable rules of law through empty exercises in
logic, through fruitless attempts to derive agreed-upon premises of
judgment from the top hat in which they are smuggled in, or
through narratives that supposedly come with an obvious meaning.
Instead, focus on the practices and the contexts that give the rules
meaning or make them mostly irrelevant. Well, enough of the rantings of an old educational radical. Your turn, Bob.
PROFESSOR ROBERT W. GORDON: Thanks, Jack. This is
clearly not a balanced panel because I'm in agreement with Schlegel
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about so many of the basic propositions that he puts forward that it's
almost not a fight at all, much less a fair fight. I wanted to say a little
something historical because of the "Then" part of the "Then and
Now" in the title of this session. One of the things I want to talk
about a little bit is why, in legal education, there's a kind of magnetic
north that the needle keeps swinging back to; that is, of all of the
things that we could be teaching in legal education, why is it that so
uniformly and continuously throughout the country, the curriculum
centers so heavily, as Schlegel points out, on the teaching of private
law doctrine? Why is that still the curricular core?
The curricular core at virtually every law school in the country is
basically the same, despite enormous variation over time and historical circumstances, variation in local contexts, and the variation in the
kinds of jobs that law graduates are being trained for at different
schools. In my native Boston, for example, there are schools that
train people largely for large firm, metropolitan corporate practice
and there are schools that train students largely for the Suffolk
County District Attorney Prosecutor's Office. Those two schools, and
others like them with different objectives, have very much the same
methods and same curricula.
This comes about despite an enormous diversity of origins. This
law school, as Jim May was reciting, has an incredibly interesting and
distinctive history. This is a school born out of the radical reform,
progressive traditions of the nineteenth century. Ellen Spencer
Mussey's family were abolitionists. They were temperance activists
and they were feminists. Her husband, General Mussey, volunteered
to command a regiment of African American troops in the Civil War.
This is very much an institution begun by radical reform entrepreneurs. Partly for that reason, its original curriculum was not just conservative, it was positively reactionary. It considered the case method
of Langdell and Harvard too advanced for its tastes and it went back
to the lecture and textbook Blackstone method.2 One very interesting innovation was making domestic relations law a required firstyear course, where it remained until the 1930s. In the 1930s, it was
shoved off into the second- and third-year elective curriculum, where
it remains in most places. But even at this remarkable institution, the
29. Langdell's model was based on the theory that cases could be categorized and then
studied to induce legal principles, whereas Blackstone's method called for an approach that
was deductive in nature. "Blackstone ... embraced a quasi-natural law model, in which legal
conclusions were deduced from a priori principles of law." AnthonyJ. Sebok, Misunderstanding
Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2054, 2086 (1995). For Blackstone, cases were used to support
principles. See Simeon E. Baldwin, The Study of Elementary Law, the ProperBeginning of a Legal
Education,13 YALE LJ. 1, 3 (1903).
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story, on the whole, is one of increasing standardization and homogenization to the national product. One of the fascinating stories of
legal education is how the Harvard private law, case method doctrinal-dominated education spreads like a deepening stain everywhere in the country.
(Laughter.)
PROFESSOR GORDON: It eventually colors all law schools exactly
the same hue, and, as I say, despite enormous variations in local contexts and local needs. What are the alternatives? Schlegel, I think,
has mentioned some of them in the working downwards from doctrine. There is clinical work and the study of practice, local law and
practice, clinical skills, trials, transactional practice, and counseling
and negotiation. There's the teaching of local contexts. There's the
teaching of business practice skills and contexts, accounting, and
corporate finance. Working away from the core, there is public and
regulatory law, administrative law, public utilities and specific regulatory fields: commerce, food and drug, public land management, security, and so forth. The history of these fields in the law school curriculum is that, at first, in the Langdell model, they're completely
excluded.3
Public law, regulatory law, and taxation were not considered law
and kept out altogether.3 ' Gradually, with the growth of the administrative state in the twentieth century, these subjects crept into the
curriculum. Again, WCL is a good example. You can trace this in
the school catalogs. Public Law subjects first come in as graduate
courses, kept in a graduate ghetto, lest they contaminate the pure
private law, the doctrinal core of the undergraduate law curriculum.
Then, by incremental creep, they come into the second and third
years as electives.
By the 1940s and 1950s, you have something like the law school
curriculum as you know it today; that is, with nineteenth century
common law ground rules as the core of the first year curriculum
and the New Deal regulatory administrative state in the second and
the third years. In the 1960s, another interesting creep begins to
come in the form of a little community halfway-house between the
ghetto of the graduate curriculum and the inner sanctum of the required curriculum. This is the seminar, the incredible proliferation
of the small seminar, largely in subjects which the conservative law30. SeeJohn Henry Schlegel, SearchingforArchimedes-LegalEducation,Legal Scholarship, and
Liberal Ideology, 34J. LEGAL EDUC. 103, 105 (1984) (detailing Langdell's model of legal education, which called for exclusion of political and economic theories).
31.

Seeid.
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yers of the 1960s contemptuously liked to label "social work," i.e.,
family law, poverty law, welfare law and, at that time, environmental
law. An interesting thing about those seminars, again, is how they
have gradually made their way into the elective curriculum of the
second and third years.
The major trend, besides standardization, has been the proliferation of electives. The Langdell first-year curriculum is still the firstyear curriculum in virtually every law school in the country. There
has been a proliferation of other approaches and courses in the second and third years.
Now, moving up and out from doctrine, one moves towards the
study of context, and, as Schlegel says, of theory. Take legal theory.
First of all, the theorizing of legal doctrinal fields and across them,
doctrinal theoretical synthesis, this is what you get in the big, classic
treatises: the analysis of elementary legal categories, contract, fault,
and trusts. Moving upward from there, you get to jurisprudence and
comparative law or to policy and the science of legislation: the studies of purposes and effects of legal regimes. Moving upward and
outward from there, you get to social science: economics, political
economy, and sociology, which are all handmaidens to the science of
legislation. And finally, upward and way outward, mostly found in
the seminars, you find the study of law from the outside: social science, history, theory, and so forth, whose job is not so much to improve the efficiency of the practices that we do as it is to try to understand and criticize those practices from the viewpoint of the external
observer.
An interesting question is why does the needle keep swinging back
to the magnetic north of the private law doctrine-dominated curriculum in the history of legal education? This is particularly striking because ever since the beginning, there has been an alternative track; a
great alternative. I shouldn't actually say an alternative because it was
a supplement. Nobody ever proposed, until Schlegel, actually doing
away with the private law doctrinal curriculum. Actually, that's not
true. Schlegel has some distinguished predecessors: the legal realists
of whom he, himself, is a premier scholar." But there have been
proposals since the beginning of the Republic for supplementing the
doctrinal private law education with an education that you could
call-as it was called in the nineteenth century-the science of legislation, and what we would now, I think, call law as policy.
32. See id.
33. Realism has been a competing model with Langdell's Method. See SCHLEGEL, supra
note 18, at 107 (noting that legal realists' model failed to supplant that of Langdell).
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Now, what was this alternative? This notion that law schools should
be primarily policy schools, instructors in the principles and practices
of legislation-this has, as I say, long been the great alternative to
doctrinal and black-letter education in law, just as policy studies of
law have long been the great alternative to a strictly legal science,
meaning the clarification and ordering of existing doctrines into legal categories.M
The modern idea of law as a policy science was first and most brilliantly developed in the Scottish school of jurisprudence and the
moral and political economy of Adam Smith, David Hume, Francis
Hutcheson, Lord Kames, Adam Ferguson, John Millar, and their
friends. 5 Remember that Adam Smith's great book, his great treatise
on political economy, The Wealth of Nations,- started out as one of his
lectures onjurisprudence. It was a lecture on the police power.
So you have in Scotland in the late eighteenth century, and particularly in the work of Adam Smith, a complete uniting of law and
political economy as the proper subject for the study of law. To
Smith's school, law was part of an aggressively reformist, interdisciplinary enterprise of improvement; a blend of moral philosophy, political economy, and the comparative historical sociology of legal
practices and institutions.3 7 It was a study which was designed to
purge the governing legal regime of its obsolescence or its antique
features and to reconfigure it to the needs and the ethical values of a
modern society.M
The project was picked up by Jeremy Bentham and by utilitarian
reformers in the nineteenth centurys 9 Despite this brilliant beginning, the science of legislation, as a preferred approach to training
lawyers, tended to fizzle out in the nineteenth century.4 The question is why the idea keeps running up against a brick wall, or rather a
spongy wall, a wall that seems to give way only, again and again to
push us back to where we were before.
Well, it seems to me that there have to be really two conditions that
are satisfied in order for the idea to take hold. One is that there has
to be some plausible set of jobs that graduates can do which will re34.

See McDougal, supra note 18, at 1345 (calling for application of policy science to study

of law).

35.

See generally KNUD HAAKONSSEN, THE SCIENCE OFA LEGISLATOR (1981).

36. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Knopfed., 1991) (1776).
37. See DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURYBRITAIN 144-75 (1989).

38.
39.

See id.
See id. at 241-90.

40. See STEFAN COLLINI, PUBLIC MORALISTS: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE
INBRITAIN, 1850-1930, at 251-307 (1991).
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quire the skills imparted by a training in law as policy, or the policy
study and policy science. Indeed, wherever you see the idea flourishing, generally there are such jobs.
In America, the causes of revolution and constitution-framing provided a lot of political work for lawyers, many of whom were already
trained for such work. As New England and New York lawyers, for
example, represented either the Crown or colonial merchants or
landowners against the Crown, quite often lawyers were themselves
members of the Chesapeake landowning gentry who had learned law
to engage in litigation with their neighbors and to serve in local legislatures.1
Harvard Law School, in the 1830s and 1840s, saw quite selfconsciously that its role was sending young men primed with the
principles of Federalist and Whig political science all over the country as legislators and members of political elites. When policy science comes into the law schools in the twentieth century, it was when
careers opened up for graduates in the progressive movements and
the New Deal.
Policy studies were strong again in the 1960s when graduates went
on to service in the New Frontier and the new public interest law centers, and again at Chicago in the 1980s where young Federalist Society members could expect rapid promotion in the corridors of power
in the Justice Department, other administrative agencies, or conservative think tanks.
So, law training has to open up opportunities for practice. There
must be jobs and, preferably, careers. But besides that condition,
another one has to be met. There needs to be professional receptivity to it, and this is always a problem because the study of policy has
to be incorporated into the law without threatening the indigenous
craft techniques or the ideology, autonomy, or neutrality of law-the
idea of the rule of law as something distinct from politics.
Policy cannot be or be perceived to be mere politics. It has to
seem to possess an objective or scientific character. Yet, to the extent
that its objective or scientific character is imparted through study of
another discipline, for example, sociology or economics, it isn't law.
41. See, e.g., Clement Eaton, A Mirrorof the Southern Colonial Lawyer, 8WM. & MARY L.Q. 533
(1951); Milton M. Klein, From Community to Status: The Development of the Legal Profession in ColonialNew York, 60 N.Y. HiST. 136 (1979); John Murrin, The Legal Transformation: The Bench and
Bar of Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts, in COLONIAL AMERICA: ESSAYS IN POLITICS AND SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT (Stanley N. Katz &John M. Murrin eds., 1983).
42. See R. Kent Newmyer, HarvardLaw Schoo4 New England Legal Culture,and the Antebellum
Origins ofAmericanJurisprudence,in THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE 154-75 (David Thelen ed., 1988).
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To the extent that the policy sciences developed in other disciplines
are contentious, as they all are, borrowing from them means importing that contentiousness into the legal culture. So, over and over
again, lawyers have found that to resolve quarrels within the law, they
will turn to history, economics, sociology, or political science to find
an objective and neutral basis for lawmaking. What do they find?
Just more quarrels, often the same ones, couched in slightly different
language.
Well, the American story is complicated and because I don't want
to take up much more time, I'm not going to relate many of its complexities. The bottom line about the story is, again, a little bit of a
surprise. Many, many experiments have been tried from the beginning of the Republic. First, there was Thomas Jefferson's own plan
for teaching law at the University of Virginia, where he called for a
curriculum of the common and statute law; the law of chancery; the
law's feudal, civil, mercatorial, and maritime aspects; the law of nature, and of nations; and also the principles of government and political economy.43 Education in the principles of legislation remained
a general aspiration of the elite bar until the end of the nineteenth
century.44
Yet, again and again, attempts to institutionalize legal education
fell flat. Columbia in 1857 is entirely typical. It planned ajurisprudence curriculum including modern history, political economy,
natural and international law, and civil and common law. By the following year, it was clear that to attract any students, the curriculum
would have to be pruned back to those branches of municipal law
usually appropriately pursued for obtaining a license to practice, with
the hope that occasional lectures in the extra studies 45might be offered as an extra sweetener once students were enrolled.
The progressive movement and the New Deal seemed to help answer the question of what lawyers could do with their policy training,
particularly here in a city like Washington, D.C. By 1939, there were

43. See STEVENS, supranote 13, at 4-5, 71 n.86 (explaining Thomas Jefferson's approach to
legal education at University of Virginia, where he sought to create statesmen, legislators and
judges in Southern tradition through liberal teaching approach broader than that of northern
schools). Under Jefferson's approach, law was taught as a "liberal and liberating study,"
whereas the northern approach emphasized law as a "technical and professional study." See id.
at 5.
44. See id. at 57-58 (assessing 1891 American Bar Association report attacking Langdell's
case method for causing increased litigation and arguing that lawyers should concentrate on
knowing rules of law and keeping clients out of court).
45. SeeJULIUS GOEBELJR., A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 27-29
(1955) (explaining Columbia's proposal for broad curriculum and problems with attracting
students desiring courses more applicable to practice and passing bar exam).
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over 5000 lawyers in federal government service. 46 In the four years
between 1938 and 1942, the legal staff in the Antitrust Division of the
Justice Department alone went from 111 to 583.
In the 1940s, a
flood of articles pointed out these developments and the private lawyer's role, as a practical statesman, in the architecture of privateordering structures that had to serve clients' long-run purposes and
comply with regulatory statutes .8 The law schools needed to prepare
people to master the substantive regulatory fields and the administrative processes of their new craft to realize long-term social effects.
New Dealers returned to staff the law schools. 49
What impact did they have? Surprisingly little. New Deal statutes
were brought into the curriculum, where they were rapidly assimilated into the common law model of doctrinal analysis. The firstyear curriculum remained the domain of nineteenth century baseline
common law rules. The upper years were reserved for the New Deal
statutes, but then case law glosses on the statutes became the subjects.
Only at a few places-and I think one has to give Chicago some
credit for this-was the mold broken.5'
Well, what's the situation today? The law schools, as they are now,
probably represent the most ambitious attempts to integrate law and
policy since the Scottish Enlightenment, 2 though the integration is
46. SeeEmeryJ. Woodall, CareerServicefor FederalLawyers, 4 FED. B. ASS'NJ. 235, 235 (1941)
(detailing changing role of government lawyers and maintaining that as of 1939, more than
5000 legal positions existed in federal government).
47. See Cor-win D. Edwards, Thurman Arnold and the Antitrust Laws, 58 POL. SCI. Q. 338, 339
(1943). Appropriations for this same time period similarly increased from $473,000 to
$2,325,000. See id. In 1943, however, World War II brought a decrease in the Division's staff to
496 members, while funding fell to $1,800,000. See id.
48. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Modem Approach to Counseling and Advocacy-Especially in
Commercial Transactions,46 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 167-95 (1946) (discussing legal approaches to
commercial transactions, including problem-solving role of attorneys as counselors in non-legal
situations); Karl N. Llewellyn, Crafts of Law Revalued, 28 A.BA J. 801, 801-03, 844 (1942)
(discussing need for practical application of law and increased public service from attorneys).
49. See STEVENS, supra note 13, at 160 (describing return of faculty members from New
Deal service and growing acceptance of idea that law professors should be teaching public service).
50. See Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the "Middle Ground,'91 MICH. L. REV.
2075, 2083 (1993) (discussing the preoccupation during the 1950s with case law and its application to New Deal statutes as a retreat to formalism).
51. See FRANK L. ELLSWORTH, LAW ON THE MIDWAY 67-68 (1977) (observing that early curriculum, influenced by Ernest Freund, University of Chicago Professor of Law and Political Science, included history, political economy and science, and sociology; discussing subsequent
adoption of Harvard's competing case method, which angered Freund); see also Gordon, supra
note 50, at 2084-85 (discussing Freund's plans for University of Chicago to supplement private
law thrust of legal education with courses in public law and policy science, in order to train attorneys for work in regulatory system).
52. The Scottish Enlightenment during the eighteenth century sought human betterment
through the pursuit of science and the reformation of philosophy, economics, and jurisprudence. Its leading participants included David Hume, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson and John
Millar. See IAN SIMPSON Ross, THE LIFE OF ADAM SMITH xviii (1995) (discussing scope of Scot-
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very truncated and partial.-s As in the 1930s and 1940s, there's a big
gulf between the sometimes intimidating, interdisciplinary character
of the scholarship, which led Judge Richard Posner to speak of the
decline of law as an autonomous discipline -- a decline which he had
done more than any other single person to bring about.
(Laughter.)
PROFESSOR GORDON: The everyday teaching of law, as evidenced by casebooks, remains overwhelmingly doctrinal and formalist.55 The policy appears in the brief introductory overviews and then
again periodically in the snippets and footnotes through the rest of
the book. The vanguard of the policy forces has gained a beachhead
mainly in the specialized upper-year courses concerning family law,
water law, or health law, where issues of policy, context, and institutional design overwhelm those of doctrine.
Policy has invaded torts books for presumably the same reason.
The tort system is in a crisis. The fall of the old doctrinal citadel has
made issues of the economic basis of tort liability inescapable. But in
many fields, as Schlegel says, where you'd expect to find the influence of the study of policy and context, it's surprisingly, and almost
totally, missing.
You'd think that in a corporations class you might learn something
about corporations in the society and political economy; about the
character of their institutional relations with shareholders, institutional investors, creditors, customers, suppliers, labor forces, and legal communities; about the internal politics and organization of
business firms that are crucial to understanding the range and limits
of the influence of corporate counsel; and about the extraordinary
recent transformations in capital markets, international product and
labor markets, and methods of production that have created a new
generation of legal headaches and operating environments for corporate management and their lawyers. But it's not there. In the adventurous books, that is, in the books with the lowest market share,
there's usually a little economics.- This is sometimes efficiency-oftish Enlightenment).
53. See David Barnhizer, The University Ideal and Clinical Legal Education, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REv. 87, 92-93 (1990) ("American law schools are still caught astride a chasm that separates the
Scylla of the academic university from the Charybdis of the practicing profession .... American law faculty have long been caught between the demands by the seeming incompatibility of
the basic visions and functions of the university and those of educating aspiring lawyers.").
54. See Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100
HARV. L. REv. 761,777-78 (1987).
55. See Gordon, supra note 50, at 2108 (complaining about overwhelmingly doctrinal flavor of today's legal textbooks).
56. See MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 1-14 (1995) (offering
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common-law-economics in the early Posner-Chicago style, more often
these days, some Williamsonian neo-institutional analysis,57 sometimes a little finance theory is applied to takeover markets.
In labor law, it's the same story. A field with a superb institutional
literature, to judge by the case books, checks its policy concerns at
the door of the classroom. The neoclassical and neo-institutional labor economics on the role of unions, the comparative work on the
relative weakness of unions in American economic and political life,
and the new management and worker relations emerging from the
transformed economy are just not there.
Maybe the most amazing field is criminal law and procedure.
Criminal law, to judge by the case books-Schlegel mentioned this,
too-is mainly about the doctrinal elements of crimes, constitutional
motion practice, and somewhat peripherally, about theories of punishment. It's not about, among other things, crime, criminals, or the
criminal process in which criminal lawyers put in their time. It's not
about policing, prosecutorial discretion, plea bargaining, sentencing,
prisons, or parole. A more extreme example of the attitude that if
there aren't a lot of cases on it, it doesn't exist, would be hard to find.
There is some reason for hope. There actually seems to be more
of a genuine movement in this direction in law teaching these days
than there has been at any other point since what is still, in some
ways, the high point, which occurred during the late eighteenth century. Things have really never approached or re-approached the
peak represented by Adam Smith's classes at Edinburgh during the
1760s."8 Nevertheless, I think there is some room for hope, if this is
the direction that you would like to encourage, but this change is
painfully incremental, gradual, and slow.
Jim [May] spoke of historical changes in context, local variations,
and tendencies toward national uniformity and historical continuity.
I hope the time is coming when changes in context and variations in
locality will begin to overwhelm the forces of national uniformity and
continuity, whose inertial drag has been considerable on our enterprise. Perhaps that time is coming, but it is not yet here.
PROFESSOR JOAN WILLIAMS: Let me say first that I am very
"An Overview of the Law and the Economics of the Firm," including economic theory, and discussing different forms of corporate structuring).
57. See OLIVERWILLIAMSON, INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985).
58. See ANDREW STEWART SKINNER, A SYSTEM OF SOCIAL SCIENCE: PAPERS RELATING TO
ADAM SMITH 7-8 (1996) (discussing lectures of 1748-50 at Edinburgh and Adam Smith's subsequent adoption of similar style at Glasgow University during the 1750s and 1760s in opposition
to standard teaching style of period emphasizing logic and metaphysics); see also ROSS, supra
note 52, at 97-98 (1995) (observing Adam Smith's rhetorical teaching style).
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honored to be on the panel today with two people I have always admired, both of whom were major figures in the critical legal studies
movement." In a well known 1984 Stanford Law Review volume on
Critical Legal Studies, for example, Jack [Schlegel] and Bob
[Gordon] were two of the major authors ° I want to pick up on some
of the themes the panelists have mentioned so far and tie them together with the issue of privilege and what it means, both to people
who have it and to those who are trying to gain access to it.
Picking up on the model thatJack and Bob talked about, they basically set up a good-guy and bad-guy model of legal education. Jack
and Bob define the good and the bad guys slightly differently, although not very differently. The bad guy of both stories is what Bob
called the magnetic north of legal education. In other words, we
keep returning to this nineteenth century private law-dominated curriculum. This curriculum is defined both by its focus on private law
and by its focus on doctrine.
As Bob pointed out, one of the ways of describing what happened
during the nineteenth century with people like Langdell is as part of
a much broader movement in the nineteenth century that started
with political economy: a topic that combined, from our point of
view, moral philosophy, politics, and economics, and considered
them all one and the same. It started from that model and went to a
very different model of social "science." This is documented in a
wonderful history of American social science by Dorothy Ross.6' She
documents the period in which Americans veered away from the
model of political economy to the model of social science, in economics, in sociology-in all of the American social sciences. In the
social science model, social thought is reconceptualized along a
model of natural science and is tied to a specific political philosophy
and a series of naturalizing metaphors. We often call that political
philosophy "possessive individualism" or "economic liberalism." Ross
documents the process by which economic liberalism was read into
the structure of the universe.
One useful way to read Langdell is as a part of this larger strategy
of reading possessive individualism into the structure of the universe.
59. SeeJoan C. Williams, CriticalLegal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the
New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 429 (1987) (uncovering cracks in epistemological foundation of critical legal studies); see also ROBERTO MANABEIRA, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
MOVEMENT (1983) (discussing critical legal studies movement as undermining central ideas of
modem thought and arising from leftist modem legal thought and practice).
60. SeeJohn Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of
the Conference on CriticalLegal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391 (1984); Robert W. Gordon, Critical
Legal Histories,36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).
61. See DOROTHY ROSs, THE OIGINS OFAMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1990).
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So that is where we start out, this Langdellian heritage.
The alternative, which both Jack and Bob have talked about a lot,
particularly in Jack's recent and influential study of legal realism, 62 is
a law-as-policy-science approach. Jack followed the early Yale legal
realists in focusing on the distinction between "law in the books" and
law in practice. He urges people to study what lawyers actually dothe actual routine practices of practicing law.'s Of course, WCL is
one of the best schools in the country to do this because we have
such wonderful and influential clinics. Bob has described the approach a little bit differently, in keeping with a different part of the
Yale legal realist tradition, by emphasizing the need to train lawyers
to see that accepted principles ofjudgment are based on "policy.""
An integral part of legal realism was a very conscious re-invention
of the role of the lawyer as "public counsel,"6 which I'm familiar with
because my father's career epitomized this new role. My father
graduated from Yale Law School at the height of legal realism. He
took the idea that you had to integrate law with policy so seriously
that he became a city planner. As Bob pointed out, that's one of the
anxieties that legal realism awoke; that people would take the idea of
lawyer as policymaker so seriously that they would cease to be real
lawyers. In a sense, my father was one of those, but he also wrote a
multi-volume legal treatise!
As the author of a case book,66 I reject almost equally both the
Langdellian model that stresses that the goal of legal education is to
train students to seek accepted premises of judgment through legal
doctrine, and that version of legal realism that trains law students to
seek accepted premises of judgment through policy. It seems to me
that these models leave in place a dichotomy between law and policy
that is totally unviable. This is partly because I teach a topic, property, that is not defined in terms of nineteenth century legal categories. Although property has always been part of the Langdellian
canon, property as a concept has an intellectual history quite inde-

62. See SCHLEGEL, supra note 18, at 256 (discussing policy science or policy analysis approach practiced by "the heirs of [legal] Realism").
63. See id. at 82-83 (discussing Yale's early realists' proposals to establish Institute of Procedure to discover ways to reform conventional legal practice).
64. See generally LAuRA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM ATYALE, 1927-1960, at 67 (1986) (reviewing Yale and Columbia's attempts to make legal education more policy-oriented and efficient
by merging law with social sciences).
65. SeeJoan C. Williams, At the Fusion of Horizons: Incommensurabilityand the Public Interest,
20 VT. L. REV. 625, 628-29 (1996) (defining public counsel as one who applies his or her own
values in public interest as a bulwark against and rejection of corporate business class lawyering).
66. C. BERGER &J.WILLIAMS, PROPERTY: LAND, OWNERSHIP, AND USE (1997).
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pendent of the law.
If you are trying to train students how to talk as property lawyers,
you have to train them in a rhetoric of property that has always existed apart from property doctrine. And yet there are also forces that
pull you back towards the "magnetic north" Bob describes. These
forces concern the link, rarely discussed, between law school and
class formation.
One role of law school has been to train members of the elite to
assume elite positions. Langdell invented his curriculum at Harvard
to boss around other members of the elite.67 At Yale Law School, the
role of public counsel re-vamped the idea that we were going to train
certain members of the elite, this time as public counsel, to boss
around other members of the elite.
But training members of the elite to lead is only one social role law
schools have played. Another, far more important one is that in this
country, seeking a legal education has been a way that people who
were not born into the elite seek to enter the elite. This imaginative
role of legal education, this romantic, striving, and symbolic role, is
why we have massive numbers of students to this day, talented ones
who are in this room, seeking a legal education in a sharply constricting market. Many WCL students continue to seek a legal education
because they seek what the lawyer's role has promised for so long:
the ability to do good and to do well simultaneously. That's part of
the attraction of law school. WCL students today also seek, in an era
of de-industrialization, to ensure their continuation or ascension into
the elite, to use a timely and ecclesiastical metaphor.
If you are involved in legal education, and specifically if you're
writing a case book, you need to think of the relationship of law to
privilege. As Bob pointed out, the case books that go the furthest
into "law and"-into law and economics, or law and history, or in law
and whatever-have the least market share. That's partly because the
role of most law schools is to serve people who are trying to gain access to the elite, which produces a very conservative tenor. So that if
you're doing something weird, for example, like Ellen Spencer
Mussey and Emma Gillett did, you try to make up for your weirdness
by being extremely traditional, as they did in legal education and as
most law school textbooks do to this day. That is a very strong impetus towards preserving this traditional nineteenth century canon and
the traditional sequence of topics in a case book and in legal educa-

67. SMSTEVENS, supra note 13, at 63 (describing appeal of case method at Harvard and its
ability to allow lawyers to enter elite class more readily).
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tion. I would explain the magnetic north that Bob talks about partly
in terms of legal education and its relationship to class formation.
Going back to the relationship between the study of law as the
study of doctrine and policy science, I think we really have to go beyond both of those. We certainly no longer believe that you can deduce neutral conclusions from legal doctrines, but I don't believe
that you deduce neutral policies from anything. How can you say in
Washington, D.C., that a given rule reflects "public policy"? If you
live in this town, you may have noticed that we don't agree on public
policy. That's why I've said in various published works that the
phrase "public policy" deadens the mind to legal contradiction.6
The legal contradiction is that we do not agree on public policy,
and yet within the rhetoric of the law, the phrase "public policy" is
used as a solution. Oh, we're going to change this tort doctrine because of public policy, to which the obvious response is, which public
policy?
I think you have to reject both the law as doctrine and the law as
public policy models and go to a model that I think of as law as
rhetoric. In the context of property that means to me that you have
to teach property law as part of a political rhetoric in this country in
which people talk about whether property rights should be stable and
the extent to which they should be redistributed. There are some
very strong native traditions of redistribution which you can teach
students-and you can teach them to use these traditions in arguing
property cases. Then you teach students how to translate this political rhetoric, the intersections between the general political rhetoric
of property and the translations of that rhetoric, into legal doctrine.
If you teach law that way, you're not teaching anything as an answer. You're not teaching either doctrine or policy as an answer.
You're teaching students to play-to participate in political life in a
specific way-in a way we call being a lawyer. But that doesn't answer
the question of what role students will play in political life. In a
sense, we're going back to the earlier model of political economy. At
that point, you are combining moral inquiry with politics and economics on the theory that you cannot separate these three.
PROFESSOR MAY: Let's see if there are comments or additions or
responses by various people on the panel. Then hopefully we'll have
68. See Williams, supranote 65, at 630-34 (discussing differences between those who view
law as objective and critical legal scholars who view law as ideological); Joan C. Williams, The
Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The Politics of City Status in American
Law, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 83, 97-99 (examining the study of law as ideology and its effects on
scope of power of cities).
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some time to open it up for questions and comments from the audience.
PROFESSOR SCHLEGEL:
Well, it's interesting what Joan
[Williams] had to say, because my response to Bob, who keeps telling
me this extraordinarily fascinating stuff about the science of legislation, which I quite clearly love, is to get around the distinction between law and politics, which I think bedevils us completely. As long
as we see policy as, in some sense, not law-and the achievement of
the eighteenth century was to see policy as something that was lawwe're not going to get very far. The point of my shift to practices is
to try to avoid that, to avoid putting the social sciences and economics together with the law, to take the "and" out of the phrase "law
and" and to get students to study what those practices are. My reason
for doing so is one that Joan identified, and that is her discussion
about the aspiration toward class formation. So much of the law is
like understanding what fork to eat with and understanding what arguments are appropriate and inappropriate. What are the accepted
and unaccepted bases of doing things?
Teaching at Buffalo, I find that a great number of my students,
many of whom are actually interested in corporate practice in some
sense, have no idea what corporate practice looks like or what corporate behavior is like. So, every day in Corporations, we start with the
same question: "What is in today's Wall Street Journalthat befuddles
you?" I teach from the front or back page of the Wall StreetJournalor
from any page the students find interesting in every class. My point is
to try to expose people to those things that distinguish the lawyers on
the basis of what fork they use. Do you know what an oyster fork is?
It strikes me that in this way, it is the conservative tenor adopted by
radicals that is the mistake that perpetuates what Karl Llewellyn used
and called, wonderfully, dog-law." Llewellyn referred to the way we
train law students in class as the same way you train a dog. When a
dog does something you don't want it to do, you hit it over the nose.
Nowadays, when a law student makes an argument that is inappropriate, someone sort of helps them along with their stuff. The old fash-

69. SeeAnthony D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1, 37 n.69 (1983). Jeremy Bentham originally developed the concept of dog-law. See id. Bentham stated:
Do you know how they make [the common law]? Just as a man makes laws for his
dog. When your dog does anything you want to break him of, you wait until he does it
and then you beat him. This is the way you make law for your dog, and this is the way
judges make laws for you and me. They won't tell a man beforehand ....The French
have had enough of this dog-law; they are turning it as fast as they can into statute law,
that everybody may have a rule to go by ....
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ioned way was to just knock them down and go on to the next
speaker. Students for whom class formation is important need to
have this done explicitly and to be told, "This is a grapefruit fork.
This is an oyster fork. Do you see the difference in the little tines?
One is straight and the others have little curved hooks on the end."
By focusing on practice and explicitly on understanding the practice
in its fullness as sociology, economics, and institutional behavior, you
give students a leg up-the ability to understand.
One of my favorite scenes in the whole world is Jack Nicklaus getting his green jacket from the Masters and he can't quite figure out
how to get it on. Nicklaus gets one arm into it, but the coat is low.
He's trying to reach up and finally, the gentleman who is putting the
coat on Nicklaus, this sort of backwoods character, who may never
have had anyone hold a coat for him, brings the coat down and then
up over Nicklaus's arm and it works fine. In worlds where you don't
know exactly how to get the coat on but you'd like to wear it because
it's really spiffy, such is the explicit task of the social learning that I've
spent so much time on, and, indeed, love, as anyone knows who's
read my stuff. I love some of this crazy old shit and that's why you do
it. That's why you focus on practices in their social profusion: to try
to avoid what Robert [Gordon] clearly sees-in my case, I don't hide
it-as an underlying concern about policy that runs very deep.
PROFESSOR GORDON: I wish I disagreed more with my fellow
panelists because that would make it more interesting. I like to be
contentious, but I actually don't disagree with Joan Williams or Jack
Schlegel very much. They're both saying that one of the problems
with constructing the notion of doctrinal and policy education alternatives is that it reinforces the law and policy distinction. I agree with
that. I don't think that in a sound conception of law there is any law
or policy distinction-that all law is, in fact, policy. We have to find
ways to communicate this in our law teaching that will not make students put down their pencils when they hear or think they're about
to hear something which is not quite law or something else.
I agree with Jack that the way to avoid that "putting down the pencil moment," when people feel that they're venturing into a strange
land, is to concentrate on practices, problems, and situations. If
you're trying to solve a set of concrete problems in a concretely described situation, you'll want to use whatever tools are useful to the
purpose. I think most students realize that. They realize, for example, that there's a point at which the doctrine just runs out of ideas
for how to solve things because the doctrines all seem to conflict or
are too vaguely specified. You have to turn to some other set of tools.

1998]

LEGAL EDUCATION

773

I agree with Joan that when you turn to that other set of tools, the
economics, the political economy, the moral philosophy, the moral
reasoning, and so forth, you don't get any more definite answers. Instead, you get richer, more interesting, and, I think, more meaningful answers. I think it's right that lawyers often avoid going into these
neighboring worlds partly because it threatens their identity as lawyers and partly because when they go into those neighboring worlds,
they leave the security of the rhetoric which they have learned to be
comfortable with for the insecurity of new rhetoric in which they
have not learned to be comfortable and in which there are other experts who are much more skilled than they are. But what are we supposed to be good at as lawyers if not at being magpies or if not at
cannibalizing neighboring disciplines and picking up new ways of
speaking and incorporating them into our practice? That is the generalist skill of the lawyer, and I think it always has been.
Just one observation about class formation. Joan, it seems to me, is
absolutely right, but I do want to differ slightly with her about one
thing. It's true-and WCL is a good example-that Dean Ellen
Spencer Mussey inaugurated WCL with the most conservative curriculum possible because she was taking so many risks in another dimension: training women for the practice of law. An intellectually
risky curriculum would have been an unnecessary and extravagant
risk. I think that's absolutely right. You have this combination of a
very conservative curriculum and this rather activist social reform
project throughout the school's early history. There's an early
graduate I noticed called Nanette Paul who was involved in progressive education, the Women's International Peace Society, and the Susan B. Anthony Foundation while writing practical hornbooks on legal subjects and an incredibly conservative paean to the common law
called The Heart of Blackstone.70
(Laughter.)
PROFESSOR GORDON: This combination of intellectual conservatism and social activism is very appealing. But I don't think the notion of the lawyer as a policy activist, the lawyer as civic activist, the
lawyer as the statesman or stateswoman, or the lawyer as civic leader,
if you like, is peculiar in any way to the children of elites. It's true
that people who are upwardly mobile and aspirational often want to
chose the most conservative path: the least intellectually and politically risky path to improve their class position. On the other hand, if
you look at the history of twentieth century legal reform movements,
70.

NANETTE BAKER PAUL, THE HEART OF BLACKSTONE (1915).

THE AMERICAN UNIvERSrIY LAw REvIEw

[Vol. 47:747

while some of them are led by children of elites, they're for the most
part led by children of marginals-women, African American, and
Jewish lawyers, for example-partly because they're excluded from
the mainstream paths of opportunity and they find ways which inspire them to remake their society.
WCL is an interesting example of both projects at once. Mussey
and Gillett were both, in a way, children or members of an elite, although a surprising elite. On the other hand, when Mussey and Gillett opened the Law School, there were no educational attendance
requirements, except for passing an exam in English. If you were either a high school or a college graduate, you didn't have to take the
exam in English. Otherwise, you only had to take the exam in English.
One of the things that is inspiring, but also somewhat heartbreaking about the WCL project in its earliest years, was that it was very realistic and modest about its aspirations. The early catalogs say, "The
executive departments of the Government, especially the Patent,
Pension, and General Land Offices, afford an opportunity for legal
in cases
investigation which qualifies
7 1 the student for special practice
before such departments."
Mussey and Gillett knew that if the Law School graduates were going to be employed as lawyers, the single largest employer was the
federal government. But the 1899-1900 catalog also says, and here's
the heartbreaking note of realism, "A demand exists in law offices for
stenographers and typewriters [typists] having a legal training, and
higher wages are paid for such services. '' 2
Indeed, many of WCL's early graduates were limited in their reach
by those jobs. But, of course, for those graduates, those jobs as stenographers and typists in private law offices were a step into the
working world and an enormous step up in most cases in economic
opportunity and class position.
This is sort of the paradox of law as a profession in America. It's
an extremely conservative profession which has, at the same time,
been a quite effective corridor and avenue of upward mobility for a
lot of people.

71. WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW, WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW CATALOGUE 1899-1900,
at 8 (1899).
72. Id.

